Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Public Understanding of Science
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Jasanoff, S.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati  
What's this?

Civilization and madness: the great BSE scare of 1996

Sheila Jasanoff

Department of Science and Technology Studies at Cornell University, 632 Clark Hall, Ithaca, New York 14853-2501, USA

During the UK's BSE crisis of 1996, citizens and their public institutions experienced an unprecedented breakdown of communication that I call `civic dislocation'—a mismatch between what governmental institutions were supposed to do for the public, and what they actually did. Trust in government vanished, and people looked elsewhere for information and advice. In the UK, public confidence in governmental advisers rests on the reliability of persons rather than (primarily) the rationality of their views; in the USA, on the other hand, trust rests in formal processes and styles of reasoning that ensure the transparency and objectivity of governmental decisions. UK policy institutions require a set of conditions—among them a shared, unambiguous problem definition, relative certainty about `objective facts' and identifiable expert knowledge—which in the BSE case simply did not exist. Given the pervasive uncertainties, the distance between citizens and experts was greatly reduced, and the lay public was almost as well positioned as the experts to make sensible decisions about how to avoid the risk of BSE. This reading of civic dislocation in the UK should make us wary of recent proposals to create pockets of insulated expertise within the US risk management system to neutralize unfounded public fears through rationality, expertise, insulation and authority. A programme that values rationality and efficiency most highly leaves little room or reason for lay inputs; and, by putting too little faith in people and too much in the objectivity of formal analysis, may also carry the seeds of civic dislocation.

Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 6, No. 3, 221-232 (1997)
DOI: 10.1088/0963-6625/6/3/002


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Public Understanding of ScienceHome page
U. Felt, M. Fochler, A. Muller, and M. Strassnig
Unruly ethics: on the difficulties of a bottom-up approach to ethics in the field of genomics
Public Understanding of Science, May 1, 2009; 18(3): 354 - 371.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Public Understanding of ScienceHome page
M. J. Lehmkuhl
Congruency within rural social networks as an indicator of interpersonal influence on risk judgments: the great stir caused by BSE in a village in northern Germany.
Public Understanding of Science, October 1, 2008; 17(4): 485 - 502.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Public Understanding of ScienceHome page
R. Schibeci and J. Harwood
Stimulating authentic community involvement in biotechnology policy in Australia
Public Understanding of Science, April 1, 2007; 16(2): 245 - 255.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Social Studies of ScienceHome page
S. Hilgartner
Overflow and Containment in the Aftermath of Disaster
Social Studies of Science, February 1, 2007; 37(1): 153 - 158.
[PDF]


Home page
J Health PsycholHome page
H. Joffe and N. Y. L. Lee
Social Representation of a Food Risk: The Hong Kong Avian Bird Flu Epidemic
J Health Psychol, July 1, 2004; 9(4): 517 - 533.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Public Understanding of ScienceHome page
J. M. Greenberg
Creating the "Pillars": Multiple Meanings of a Hubble Image
Public Understanding of Science, January 1, 2004; 13(1): 83 - 95.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Public Understanding of ScienceHome page
K. O'Neill
A Vital Fluid: Risk, Controversy and the Politics of Blood Donation in the Era of "Mad Cow Disease"
Public Understanding of Science, October 1, 2003; 12(4): 359 - 380.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Discourse StudiesHome page
H. CALSAMIGLIA and C. L. FERRERO
Role and Position of Scientific Voices: Reported Speech in the Media
Discourse Studies, May 1, 2003; 5(2): 147 - 173.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Science CommunicationHome page
M. C. Nisbet and B. V. Lewenstein
Biotechnology and the American Media: The Policy Process and the Elite Press, 1970 to 1999
Science Communication, June 1, 2002; 23(4): 359 - 391.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Science Technology Human ValuesHome page
M. E. Goncalves
The Importance of Being European: The Science and Politics of BSE in Portugal
Science Technology Human Values, October 1, 2000; 25(4): 417 - 448.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Public Understanding of ScienceHome page
S. Yearley
Making systematic sense of public discontents with expert knowledge: two analytical approaches and a case study
Public Understanding of Science, April 1, 2000; 9(2): 105 - 122.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Science Technology Human ValuesHome page
G. Rowe and L. J. Frewer
Public Participation Methods: A Framework for Evaluation
Science Technology Human Values, January 1, 2000; 25(1): 3 - 29.
[Abstract] [PDF]